Speech about Egyptian Democratization to the Arkansas Peace and Justice Coalition, January 12, 2013

 

 

Mural of Nasser, Tahrir Square, January 12, 2013

Democratization in Egypt
January 12, 2013

Thank you for inviting me here tonight. It is a real honor to have received this invitation, and be asked to speak in front of such a diverse group of progressive activists.

I am excited about the chosen topic for tonight’s talk, but I also realize its pitfalls. How do I summarize the high points of a Revolution only two years old, but one that has more excitement, plot twists, and drama than a novel by Tolstoy? I was lucky enough to live through the Egyptian Revolution, and actually arrived in Egypt to teach at the American University in Cairo on the first official day of the Revolution, January 25, 2011. I stayed in that country until December 31st, at which point I returned to the US, and began teaching at the Clinton School of Public Service.

So tonight, I am going to just briefly sketch a history of movement towards democratization in Egypt over the past two years, and what I believe are the concerns around those matters. Then, I want to invite questions from the audience to fill in the gaps people are most interested in.

Demographically, Egypt has significant economic potential. It is the most populous country in the Arab world. It has the Nile River. It has strong ties to both Africa and the Middle East and lies upon the mediterranean ocean. It has significant natural gas reserves, and massive tourist potential. It has a well developed manufacturing base, and some impressive engineering, such as the Aswan dam. It is a diverse country with approximately 90 percent of a Muslim population, ten percent Coptic Christian, and the remaining population consisting of Bahais, and traditionalists. Every shade of skin is represented in Egypt from the blue eyes and blond hair of Alexandria, to the dusky tones of the bedouin in the Sinai, and the rich dark skin of the Nubians in Upper Egypt.

So, what is the current political situation in Egypt? As you know, an enlightenment style revolution swept through Egypt two years ago.  One of the mottos of the revolution was “bread, equality and social justice.” Hosni Mubarak, a US ally, and an authoritarian, oligarchic leader was forced to leave power.

Politically, Mubarak was very beholden to the US. He was enormously corrupt. He had emerged from the military and maintained strong ties with them. Under Mubarak, business and the state became one in a manner a political scientist might characterize as nearly fascist. In an interesting twist, the military created its own business empire under his rule. Under Mubarak, the poor became desperately poor. Illiteracy increased to nearly 70 percent, and corruption was rife. Inequality increased rapidly, and as the Revolution indicated, Mubarak and his cronies stole a significant amount of the nation’s wealth under his rule.

After Mubarak left, the country was ruled for an extended period by the military, known as the Supreme Council of Armed Forces, or SCAF.  Essentially, the country remained authoritarian in this period, but the military was the leader, not Mubarak. Many viewed this as the death of one head of a two-headed hydra, where the beast remained alive.  One head had been cut off yet the other head remained.

The conservative right and liberal left categories which categorize Europe and perhaps the US simply do not fit well in Egypt. Rather, parties can more easily be divided along a crucial axis: support for a secular state, or support for a religious (Islamic) state. Another axis might be support for human rights, democratic mechanisms, social justice and the poor, or conversely support for large business, the military and an authoritarian state. So to give an example, Mubarak was secular, but pro-business and autocratic. The Muslim Brotherhood supports poverty relief, but also leans towards an Islamist state. The Nour party (Salafis) support a strong Islamist state and have no well thought out views on most of the other issues. The opposition led in part by Mohammed El Baradei, supports a secular state, the rights of women and minorities, poverty reduction, and more democratic approaches.  

As a point of clarification, being Muslim does not make one an Islamist, or a radical or al qaeda. There are many practicing Muslims who prefer a secular state. The threat, in my view, comes from the Salafis, or fundamentalists, who wish to impose a Wahabi, Saudi style, stripped down, and very strict version of Islam on Egypt. These are the people who are destroying Sufi relics in Mali, and who terrorize Afghanistan as the Taliban. Like Christianity, Islam has many voices, from the most conservative, (Wahabi) to the most liberal, perhaps the Sufi, and a whole spectrum in between.

A burst of optimism among the liberal secularists occurred as the nation prepared for the first ever truly free parliamentary elections in the Winter and Spring of 2012. However, after the dust had settled, the first post-revolutionary Egyptian parliament had few women, and many Islamists, some of them extreme. One good outcome of the parliamentary election was that the liberals and secularists did better than expected, capturing about 15 percent of the seats in the lower house. Given the fact that the majority of liberal parties were formed after the Revolution, I believe that was a strong showing.

Late in the spring, however,  the sunshine of democracy dimmed as the judiciary dismissed the lower house of parliament on technical grounds.

In June 2012, I returned to Egypt to the American University in Cairo to work on my research. In mid June, an election took place between Ahmed Shafiq, former prime minister under Mubarak and a military man, and Mohammed Morsy, a well educated engineer, and prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Tensions ran very high, and matters were tense. It appeared to be a Hobson’s Choice: on the one hand, Shafiq was resolutely secular, but nonetheless had strong ties to the deposed regime. On the other hand Mohammed Morsy was a revolutionary of sorts, but he was also clearly an Islamist. It was really a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. As we know now, it was a tightly contested election, but Morsy seems to have fairly won Egypt’s presidency.

This ushered in another strange interregnum with both democratic and authoritarian elements. An Islamist was President, the judiciary had been appointed by the old regime, and the freely elected parliament had been dismissed. After only a few months in power, Morsy stunned the world by trying to implement a power grab in late November 2012, sparking outrage and massive protests across Egypt.

Egypt’s New Constitution was approved by referendum in December, and was signed into law by President Mohamed Morsy on December 26, 2012. Human Rights Watch states that the draft constitution provides for basic protections against arbitrary dentention and torture and for some economic rights. However, it fails to end military trials of civilians or protect freedom of expression and religion. One positive development is that the final draft does not require strict adherence to sharia with regard to women's rights (former article 68 has been removed). However, sex or gender is not a grounds for prohibiting discrimination in the approved version, and potentially interferes with women's choices about work and family.

Also, in the period between Christmas and New Years, more developments occurred. In accordance with the recently passed Constitution, eight judges have been dismissed from the Supreme Constitutional Court, one of whom was the first Egyptian woman to hold a post in the judiciary. Activists believe this dismissal violates the separation of powers, and shows that the judiciary is increasingly under attack.

The dispute about the Constitution, which was largely viewed as drafted by Islamists, has had a positive side effect of bringing the opposition together. The new opposition coalition is called the National Salvation Front. This group includes Mohamed El Baradei, the Social Democratic Party (a European style left democratic group), The Free Egyptians (A free market group which has secular and coptic membership) and a variety of socialist, communist, and secular groups.

All legislative power now rests with the upper house, the Shura. A draft law on elections has been proposed by the Egyptian Shura council.  This law is being put in place to plan for a new round of parliamentary elections scheduled for April.  The National Council of Women, however,has  said the draft does not allow proper representation of women in Parliament, nor does it represent the capabilities, potential and ambitions of women after the January 25th revolution.

So, in summary, there is good news and bad news about democratization in Egypt.  Egypt has made remarkable, and bold strides. It is impressive that elections were held. They were not completely free and fair, but neither were they totally rigged. The fact that the Islamists won is encouraging in the sense that the electorate did elect a completely different group into power than held power during the Mubarak government. The bad news is that the Islamists are not progressive, nor particularly interested in democratic institutions, and they seem to be consolidating their grip on power.

As we have seen, two years into the Revolution, there is still a lot of work to still be done. That is, in and of itself, not a bad thing. Please remember that the French Revolution took nearly twenty years to complete. Many countries that have gone through democratic transitions recently, including Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, often experienced long periods of partial transition. Thus, it would be realistic to assume that Egypt has a good ten to twenty years ahead of it before the democratic transition is complete.

What can American activists do to support democracy in Egypt? We can send support and training to the emerging progressive parties, such as the National Salvation Front, and urge the American government to do the same. We can also educate our fellow Americans that there are different kinds of Islam, most of which are moderate, and not affilated with al qaeda. We can also encourage support for the rule of law, and democratic processes. The best idea is to support Egyptian based NGOs doing work in these areas.

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in Egypt: Part 1

Several steps lie ahead in order for the current military government in Egypt to turn power over to a civilian government. Among these steps are writing a new constitution, electing a parliament, and electing a new president, or prime Minister. A cautionary note-- The likelihood that Egypt will become a full fledged democracy in a year is fairly low. To use a mathematical term, democracy in Egypt in the immediate term is a low-probability event. Democracy watchers in Egypt would be well-advised to be patient-- very patient.

Indeed, as a point of comparison, Kenya, received its independence in 1963. The first truly competitive multi-party election in Kenya was held in 2002, resulting in the first Kenyan president who was truly freely and fairly elected by the Kenyan people. The next election, 2007, did not go so well, and degenerated into a bloodbath, with nearly 2000 dead, and thousands of internally displaced people. In a heartening development, the Kenyan people passed a progressive new Constitution in a free and fair election in August, 2010, giving succor to those who were worried that Kenya's fledgling democracy would not make it. The 2012 election will be a test of the strength of Kenya's emerging democracy. Forty eight years after Independence, Kenya is not yet a full-fledged democracy, rather, it remains a hybrid regime, with some authoritarian tendencies. That being said, Kenya is one of the freest countries in its vicinity. I provide this example to remind the Egypt observer that this is a long path Egypt has started down. Hopefully, they will attain full democracy in a year. My fingers are crossed that Egypt will be so blessed.

One debate that has raged in Egypt the entire spring has been the timing of elections.The military has committed to holding parliamentary elections, followed by a new constitution, and presidential elections. One problem with this schedule is: 1) it does not provide sufficient time for developing a new constitution, and 2) It seems to foreclose the possibility of a true parliamentary system with a prime minister, in favor of a "strong president" system.

A threat to the emergence of a full democracy in Egypt is the SCAF's reluctance to "renounce its role in managing the affairs of the country during this crucial time in Egypt's history." (Staff, "Egypt's Deputy PM resign amid protests," Al Jazeera, July 12, 2011). Indeed, the military is moving to protect an even expand its authority. Observers had been heartened that several parties had agreed to adopt a "declaration of basic principles," to govern the drafting of the Egyptian Constitution. The thinking was that this declaration would protect a civil state, and reign in the Islamists. (Author interview with Abdel Ghaffr Shokr). However, legal scholars working on the document now suggest that the military might use the declaration to spell out the military's role in the civilian government.

One worrying provision in this declaration of basic principles, is that it could potentially make the defense budget unavailable for public or parliamentary review. (David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egypt Military Aims to Cement Muscular Role in Government," New York Times, July 16, 2011) Given that the defense budget is a huge proportion of Egypt's current budget, this provision could be extremely problematic. (Author interview with Samer Soliman). If the military retains the right to intervene broadly in Egyptian politics, it would limit popular sovereignty, constraining the emerging Egyptian democracy.

Further, I worry about the wisdom of rushing the constitutional process. In general, constitutions take years to write. By sandwiching the constitutional drafting process in between parliamentary elections and presidential elections, the SCAF is de facto limiting the time available to deliberate on the provisions of the constitution. We saw hints of this kind of a rushed process in the military's rush to put the constitutional amendments to a referendum in a matter of weeks. After little public debate, and an accelerated process, the referendum went well enough. But it was then followed by a military decree of over 50 constitutional amendments with no public input whatsoever. This process is not really a process, and is not really a democratic process.

Steps should be put in place to ensure that the parliament has a strong role in the new constitution, both on paper, and in practice. The old parliament under Mubarak, dominated by the state sanctioned National Democratic Party, was little more than a rubber stamp. Indeed, a fact-finding judicial committee recently ruled that Safwat al-Sharif, the former speaker of the Shura, and other parliamentarians masterminded the "Camel Battle" on February 2, 2011, that left several protesters dead. (Staff, Egyptians demand post-revolution changes," Al Jazeera, July 15, 2011)

The conventional wisdom had been that parliamentary elections would be held in September. Nonetheless, this schedule seemed rushed, given that Ramadan ends on August 30th (more or less). In an interview with Abdel Ghaffr Shokr in late June, Shokr explained that given the multiple steps that are required to hold elections, September elections simply were not feasible. This analysis was confirmed when the SCAF said preparations for the vote would begin on September 30th, 2011. (AP, "Arab Spring hardens into Summer of Stalemates," The Washington Post, July 14, 2011). In many ways, this delayed schedule is good news, as it gives more time for civilian, non-Islamist, non-NDP political forces to prepare for the parliamentary vote.